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I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with
two incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income
may be non-monotonic functions of a bidder’s type. Parameters permit the existence
of multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions that diﬀer in allocation, eﬃciency
and revenue. The sequence of sale aﬀects the competition for a good and therefore
also aﬀects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends
on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders. The sequence of
sale may aﬀect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative
to the number of goods. If a particular good, say α, is allocated to a strong bidder
independent of the sequence of sale, then auction revenue and the price of good α is
higher when good α is sold ﬁrst.
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1 Introduction
Much of the existing theoretical work on auctions concentrates on the allocation of a single
good1. However, in actual auctions, several heterogeneous goods are often allocated sequen-
tially. If there is no link among the goods then one may be able to apply the single-good
analysis repeatedly. However, such a link may arise if budget constraints limit a bidder’s
ability to bid for later goods when earlier prices deplete limited resources.
Individual bidders whose valuations derive from consumption (rather than resale) may
clearly be budget-constrained. But the relevance of budget constraints extends well beyond
this case. There is a theoretical literature that argues generally that the existence of agency
problems implies that ﬁrms are eﬀectively budget constrained in their investment decisions2.
There is also an empirical literature that supports this idea3. Thus, theoretical and empirical
foundations support the existence of budget constraints. In the context of auctions, for
example, even ﬁrms that are buying to re-sell may eﬀectively be budget-constrained if the
cost of borrowing increases with the amount borrowed4 (as it is standard to assume in the
ﬁnance literature) or if capital market imperfections result in budgets for projects being
determined on a yearly basis, so that the ﬁrms allocate only a ﬁxed amount of capital5
for the completion of a project. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987) shows that budget constraints
eﬀectively arise if a bidder is the agent of a principal.
When investments are relatively large then capital market imperfections can mitigate the
ability of even a large ﬁrm to borrow funding. The historic auction of radio spectrum by the
FCC in the USA is a good example of an auction in which the investments are relatively large.
Cramton (1994) ﬁnds it realistic to assume that all ﬁrms in PCS (personal communicating
services) auctions face budget constraints6. As he explains, bidders must raise funds before
the auction starts when they do not know exactly how much they will need. Given that
1 See, for example, Maskin and Riley (1984), Myerson (1981), Harris and Raviv (1981), Riley and Samuelson
(1981), Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Leininger, Linhart, and Radner
(1986), Milgrom and Weber (1982), and Wilson (1984). For a survey of the literature, see Milgrom (1987),
McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Klemperer (1999).
2 See Lewis and Sappington (1989a, 1989b), Hart and Moore (1995) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2003).
3 See Fazzari and Athey (1987), Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Whited (1992), Fazzari and Petersen
(1993), Love (2003) and Clementi and Hopenhay (2003) for empirical corroboration of budget constraints.
4 See Cramton (1995) for a discussion of the budget constraints faced by ﬁrms making large investments in
the nationwide narrowband PCS auction held in the United States in July 1994.
5 See Hendricks and Porter (1992) for empirical evidence of capital constraints in land lease auctions.
6 As do Burguet and McAfee 2005.
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fund-raising is time-consuming and costly, he states that it is reasonable to assume that
ﬁrms that come to such auctions are budget-constrained. In addition, only forty per cent
of narrow band PCS spectrum was for sale in the ﬁrst spectrum auction held by the FCC;
so that, though each spectrum auction was simultaneous, goods were allocated sequentially
across auctions as well as simultaneously within an auction.
The paper analyzes a private value sequential auction with imperfect information in
which bids are continuous. However, that the order of sale aﬀects prices and revenues can be
illustrated in a common value auction with complete information and discrete bids. Consider
an auction in which two bidders compete (under 2nd price sealed bid rules for which the bids
are in multiples of 1’s) for two goods whose values are 200 and 60 respectively. Suppose that
the income of one bidder is 130 and that of the other is 60. Note that once good 1 is sold,
the income of the winner of good 1 is reduced by the price of good 1. Bidder i’s equilibrium
bid7 for good 2 is the minimum of i’s valuation for good 2 and i’s depleted income. The price
of either good can be at most 60 since 60 is the income of one of the bidders. Let bidders
and goods be denoted by their initial incomes and values. Bidder 130 has more than enough
income to pay 60 for each good. This implies that bidder 60 is willing to pay 60 for whatever
good is brought up for sale ﬁrst since the value of each good is at least 60 and bidder 60 has
no option to win good 2 since bidder 130 has at least 70 t ob i do ng o o d2 no matter who is
allocated good 1 in equilibrium. The maximum that bidder 130 is willing to pay for good 1
depends on the order of sale.
Consider the order of sale equal to 200, 60.B i d d e r 130 faces a price of 60 on good 60
if bidder 60 loses good 200. Thus, if bidder 130 pays a price of p for good 200 then bidder
130’s payoﬀ is 200−p. If instead, bidder 130 allows bidder 60 to obtain good 200 for a price
of p ≤ 60 then bidder 60 has 60 − p to bid on good 60. In this case bidder 130 receives a
payoﬀ of p.S i n c e200 − p>pwhen p ≤ 60, bidder 130 is willing to pay more than 60 for
good 200 when it is brought up for sale ﬁrst. So, when the order is 200, 60,e a c hg o o di s
allocated to bidder 130 at a price of 60 and revenue equals 120.
Now consider the order of sale 60, 200. Bidder 130 is no longer willing to obtain good
60 at any price less than or equal to 60.I fb i d d e r130 obtains good 60 at a price of p ≤ 60,
then bidder 130 also obtains good 200 at a price of 60 so that bidder 130’s payoﬀ is 200−p.
However, if bidder 130 lets bidder 60 obtain good 60 at a price of p ≤ 60 then bidder
130 obtains good 200 at a price of 60 − p so that bidder 130’s payoﬀ is 140 + p.S i n c e
7 For the details of solutions to auctions of complete information with two budget-constrained bidders and
two goods see Benoit and Krishna 2000, Pitchik and Schotter 1988, and Pitchik and Schotter 1986.
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140 + p>200 − p for p>30, bidder 130 prefers to let bidder 60 obtain good 60 if the price
is p>30. Thus, bidder 130’s best response to a bid of 60 by bidder 60 is a bid of 59.( R e c a l l
that bids are multiples of one.) Thus, when the order of sale is 60, 200,b i d d e r60 obtains
good 60 at a price of 59, bidder 130 obtains good 200 at a price of 1 and the revenue is
60. Bidder 130 prefers to obtain good 200 at a low price under the order 60,200 than to
obtain both goods at relatively high prices under the order 200,60. The prices and revenue
generated by the order 200, 60 are higher than that generated by the order 60, 200.
The order of sale aﬀects revenue and prices whether information is perfect and bids are
discrete or whether information is imperfect and bids are continuous. The intuition derives
from the fact that once good 1 is sold, there is an option to win good 2. The value of the
option depends on the depleted income of all bidders and on the value of the good 2.T h e
depleted income depends on the order of sale. The above example might lead one to believe
that selling the more highly valued good ﬁrst always generates the highest revenue. In fact,
Benoit and Krishna (1998) show that in a complete information common value auction of
two goods and three budget-constrained bidders, this is always the case. Their result extends
to two goods and n budget-constrained bidders since it is only the top three incomes that
are relevant when analyzing the equilibria of a budget-constrained auction of two goods in a
complete information common value auction with two or more bidders. However, it is easy
to generate budget-constrained sequential common value auctions in which selling the most
highly valued of 3 goods does not generate the highest revenue8.
A more plausible proscription for revenue maximization might exist if a good is highly-
valued enough and incomes are low enough. In this case, selling the highly valued good ﬁrst
maximizes revenue9. (Thus, you might want to sell a Rembrandt before selling a ten year old
Honda Accord if you are selling both in a sequential auction.) What is not clear is whether
there are any systematic rules that govern the relationship among the prices of a good, the
revenue, and the order of sale when the valuations are similar and when the income covers
the valuation of each good. If Toyota Camrys are sold in an auction that also sells Honda
Accords, then does the order of sale still aﬀect prices and revenue?
I study a budget-constrained version of the benchmark model of a private-valuation
sealed-bid sequential auction of two goods in which two risk-neutral bidders are drawn from
8 One complete information example is that in which 3 bidders (with incomes of 60, 80 and 80) compete for
3 goods (with common values of 80, 60 and 100) using second price rules in which bids are multiples of one.
The order of sale 80, 60, 100 generates a revenue of 130 while each of the other orders generates a revenue
of 120. Benoit and Krishna (1998) provide another example in which two perfectly and completely informed
budget-constrained bidders compete for three goods with valuations A ≥ B ≥ C.
9 I show such a result in Section 7 for a restricted set of auctions.
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a single population and the information is incomplete10. When information is complete,
revenue is aﬀected, in a systematic way11, by the price formation rule (i.e. the rule that
speciﬁes the price as a function of the bids). Essentially, budget constraints impose an odd
sort of risk aversion and risk aversion causes revenue to depend on the price formation rule.
Assuming information is incomplete does not change this. In order to isolate the pure eﬀect
of the budget-constraints on the prices of goods relative to their order of sale and the price
formation rule, I restrict to a world in which the expected revenue is invariant with respect
to a class of price formation rules that includes 1st and 2nd price rules. In this world, I
ﬁnd that the auction revenue depends on the sequence of sale and that the price of a good
depends on its position in the sequence of sale in an intuitive way.
In the literature on auctions for one good, authors restrict the search for an equilibrium
among symmetric bidding functions that increase in a bidder’s type. In a budget-constrained
sequential auction of two goods, I restrict attention to symmetric bidding functions but do not
assume monotonicity. I ﬁnd that it is possible for there to exist two symmetric equilibrium
bidding functions that diﬀer with respect to eﬃciency, revenue and allocation. Whether
revenue is maximized or the allocation is eﬃcient depends on the relationship between the
bidding function and the valuation and income functions and not on the price rules.
Theorem 2 and its Corollary 3 can be used to compare the expected revenue and eﬃciency
when heterogenous goods α and β s a y ,a r es o l di nt h eo r d e rα,β to that when they are sold
in the order β,α. Revenue is maximized when the bidding function is ordinally equivalent
to the income function. The allocation is eﬃcient when the bidding function is ordinally
equivalent to the diﬀerence in valuation functions. In particular, if the valuation and income
functions are increasing then revenue is maximized and the allocation is eﬃcient when the
good whose valuation increases more rapidly in a bidder’s type is sold ﬁrst. Thus, even when
there are only two goods, selling the highest valued good ﬁrst need not generate the highest
revenue. In particular, if one is auctioning the contents of a household, then selling a wall
painting by an unknown artist (whose value may be highly variable) before the used ride-on
lawn mower (whose value may be high but publicly known) maximizes revenue.
Theorem 4 compares the prices of good 1 with that of good 2.I ft h eg oo d sa r ei d e n t i c a lf o r
each type of bidder and the bidding function is ordinally equivalent to the income function,
then the expected price of a good is higher the later it is sold. Though the price of identical
10Benoit and Krishna (2000) consider budget constrained buyers with complete information. Che and Gale
(1993) consider budget constrained buyers in one-good auctions. Pitchik and Schotter (1986), Pitchik and
Schotter (1988) and Pitchik (1989) considers budget constrained buyers with incomplete information.
11See Benoit and Krishna (2000), Pitchik and Schotter (1988), and Pitchik and Schotter (1986).
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goods increases in the order of sale, each bidder expects to pay a constant price for any good
that is won (Theorem 6) so that there is no room for arbitrage.
The price formation rule may aﬀect the price of a good even if it does not aﬀect rev-
enue (Theorem 7). In addition, auction revenue and allocation may diﬀer across symmetric
equilibrium bidding functions (Theorems 8 and 9).
When I restrict attention to 1st and 2nd price rules I obtain the following results. Theorem
10 ﬁnds that the expected price of good 1 is higher under 2nd price rules than under 1st price
rules. Theorems 11 and 12 compare the price of good α when heterogeneous goods α and
β are sold in the order α,β to the price of good α when goods α and β a r es o l di nt h e
order β,α. Whether the price of good α is higher when it is sold ﬁrst than when it is sold
second depends on how competition for the good is aﬀected by its position in the order of
sale. Competition for a good depends on the bidding function as well as the price formation
rules. Theorem 11 echoes the results of Theorem 4. Under either ﬁrst or 2nd price rules, if
the bidding function is ordinally equivalent to the income function, then good 1 is always
sold to the bidder with the higher income so that there can be no disadvantage in obtaining
the good 1. Otherwise, the more advantaged bidder could always mimic the less advantaged
one if there was a gain to doing so. As a consequence, under either price formation rule,
identical goods fetch diﬀerent prices if they are sold in sequence. The expected price of a
good is higher the later it is sold. By contrast, the results of Theorem 12 show that the
results may depend on the price formation rule. If income is constant and the equilibrium
bidding function is ordinally equivalent to the diﬀerence in valuations of the goods then the
allocation is eﬃcient and independent of the sequence of sale. This allows for variation in
how cautious bidders are in bidding for good 1. 2nd price rules allow bidders to bid up the
price with greater impunity. Under 2nd price rules the price of a good is higher when it is
sold ﬁrst rather than second. The bidder who loses good 1 may bid up its price in order to
obtain good 2 f o ral o w e rp r i c e .U n d e r1st price rules, the price of a good is higher when it
is sold second. The bidder who loses good 1 fears bidding up the price due to the possibility
of obtaining the good at too high a price.
The fact that the sequence of sale aﬀects both the prices and revenue means that the
interests of a seller who may wish to maximize the price of a good may conﬂict with those
of an auctioneer who may wish to maximize long run auction revenue. A change in the form
of the auction may change the number of bidders who are attracted by the mechanism, a
c o n s i d e r a t i o nt h a td o e sn o te n t e rm ym o d e l 12.
12McAfee (1993) and Peters and Severinov (1993) study competition among auctioneers.
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Theorems 4, 11, and 12 imply that the law of one price does not hold for similar goods in
a budget-constrained sequential auction. If the goods α and β are identical and the bidding
function is ordinally equivalent to the income function, then the expected price is higher the
l a t e ri ti ss o l d . I ft h eg o o d sα and β are similar (with a common mean) but the value of
one good is even slightly more variable than the other and income is constant across types
of bidders, then the expected price is higher the earlier it is sold under 2nd price rules; under
1st price rules, it is higher the later it is sold.
In an auction of multiple identical goods, some assumption is required in addition to
those of the standard multi-good auction model to obtain the result that the price of an
object depends on its position in the order of sale13. Weber (1983) shows that in a standard
private valuation sequential auction in which bidders are risk neutral and goods are not
linked in any way, prices of identical objects do not depend on their position in the sequence
in which they are sold when each bidder wants only one unit of the good. McAfee and
Vincent (1993) show that in the absence of risk neutrality, decreasing prices for identical
goods in a standard auction requires non-decreasing absolute risk aversion. Black and De
Meza (1993) show that, under 2nd price rules, expected prices increase with respect521to the
order of sale when bidders value additional purchases.
Ashenfelter (1989) and Ashenfelter and Genesove (1993) provide empirical evidence that
ex ante identical goods fetch prices that depend on their position in the order of sale. Ashen-
felter (1989) ﬁnds that in about half of the cases the price of a good is about twice as likely
to be lower than to be higher than the price of an identical good sold earlier, while in the
remaining cases the price does not change over time. In addition, Genesove (1993) suggests
that credit-rationing of new and used car dealers may explain the empirical evidence that
t h es e q u e n t i a lp o s i t i o no fs a l ea ﬀ e c t st h ep r i c eo fac a ri nw h o l e s a l eu s e dc a ra u c t i o n s .W h e n
goods are similar, a corollary of my results oﬀers an explanation of the evidence in terms of
the existence of a link between the goods, speciﬁcally a budget constraint that causes the
willingness and ability to pay for a good to depend not only on some absolute valuation of
the good but also on the opportunity cost of paying for good 1 when there is a subsequent
possibility of buying good 2. As the income constraints change over the course of a sequential
auction, the intensity of competition for later goods changes. A change in the order of sale
aﬀects the opportunity cost of winning a good.
Black and De Meza (1993) obtain declining expected prices in a sequential auction of
two identical goods under 2nd price rules when each of two bidders has access to a buyer’s
13See Black and De Meza (1993), Weber (1983), and McAfee and Vincent (1993).
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option14 and marginal utility is declining. When there are more than two bidders, the result
also requires some restrictions on the distribution of values. Bernhardt and Scoones (1993)
and Gale and Hausch (1992) obtain declining expected prices in a sequential auction of two
goods under 2nd price rules when bidders are risk neutral. Two assumptions that drive
Bernhardt and Scoones’ result are that no bidder can evaluate good 2 until the ﬁrst has been
allocated and that no bidder is allowed to obtain more than one good. In my model the
goods may be heterogeneous and the auction form is not restricted to 2nd price rules. The
price of a good depends on the order of sale and the interaction among the valuations and
income of bidder types. Each bidder obtains no more than one good in equilibrium, but the
bidders are not constrained ex ante from obtaining both goods independent of the prices and
bids; further, bidders know their valuations of both goods at the beginning of the auction.
In addition, the valuations and income may be non-monotonic. Other work15 deals with the
allocation of multiple goods to multiple bidders, but none of which I am aware speciﬁcally
analyzes the allocation of multiple goods auctioned sequentially to a set of incompletely-
informed, budget-constrained bidders with private valuations. The aim of the paper is to
understand how the relationship between auction revenue, allocation, prices and the order
of sale may vary within the context of a single model as a function of the relationship among
the parameters of the model and the price formation rule.
Previous models in the literature use varying assumptions to drive the relationship be-
tween the price of a good and its order of sale so that the various results are hard to compare
within the context of a single model. When I restrict to similar goods in my model, whether
the price increases or decreases with its position in the order of sale depends, in a systematic
way, on the relationship between the bidding function and the valuation and income func-
tions as well as on the price formation rules. The relationship among valuations and income
as well as the price formation rule govern the relationship between the order of sale and both
the price of a good and the revenue of the auction.
I present the model in Section 2. I relate the price of a good to its position of sale in
Section 3 and to the price formation rule in Section 4. I consider the existence of multiple
equilibrium bidding functions in Section 5. I restrict to 1st and 2nd price rules in Section 6.
I consider the robustness of the results in Section 7.
14In a sequential auction with identical goods a buyer’s option enables the bidder who wins the ﬁrst unit to
purchase as many units as are available at the price of the ﬁrst unit.
15See Benoit and Krishna (2000), Bernhardt and Scoones (1993), Bulow and Klemperer (2002), Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Weber (1979), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Menezes (1993), Gale and Hausch (1992), Gale and
Stegeman (2001), Krishna (1990,1993), McAfee and Vincent (1993), Menezes (1993), Ortega-Reichert (1968),
Palfrey (1980), Pitchik and Schotter (1986,1987), von der Fehr (1994), Weber (1983) and Swinkels (1989).
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2T h e M o d e l
There is a single population from which bidders 1 and 2 are drawn. Two heterogeneous
goods, α and β, are to be sold sequentially. The ﬁrst good sold (good 1)m a yb ee i t h e r
α or β. A bidder’s privately known type is independently and randomly drawn according
to the publicly known distribution H from the interval [0,1]; I assume that H is atomless,
continuously diﬀerentiable, and increasing on its support [0,1]. The income and valuations
o fab i d d e ro ft y p et for good γ = α,β are denoted I(t) and vγ(t), γ = α,β respectively. I
assume that vγ, γ = α,β,a n dI are continuously diﬀerentiable functions on [0,1].
I also assume that either v￿
1 − v￿
2 + I￿  =0on a set of positive Lebesgue measure or that
v￿
1 − v￿
2  =0on a set of positive Lebesgue measure. (Note that although each individual’s
income and valuations may be perfectly correlated in the case that valuations and income
increase in t, the income and valuations of one individual are not correlated with those of
any other individual. I do not assume monotonicity of the valuation or income functions.)
In order that the valuations are meaningful I assume that for each type, income is at
least equal to each valuation; in order that the budget constraint be eﬀective I assume that,
for each type, income is at most the sum of the valuations. Precisely,
vγ(t) ≤ I(t) ≤ vα(t)+vβ(t) for γ =1 ,2 and t ∈ [0,1] (1)
where the ﬁrst inequality is strict for t ∈ (0,1).
This assumption has two implications. (1) Individual t is willing and able to pay up to
I(t) in exchange for both goods. I call the maximum amount that an individual is willing
and able to pay for a good, the individual’s de facto valuation of the good. Thus, income is
an individual’s de facto valuation of holding both goods. (2) A bidder’s de facto valuation
of good 2 is the minimum of v2 and any income remaining after any payment for good 1 is
made. A bidder’s de facto valuation of good 1 takes into account the fact that the higher
the price paid by the winner of good 1 the lower the winner’s de facto valuation of good 2.
Thus, losing good 1 at a higher price may enable a bidder to obtain good 2 at a lower price.
Ab i d d e ro ft y p et is constrained not to spend more than I(t) (t’s income) in the auction.
All units (i.e. bids, budgets and valuations) are restricted to be non-negative. Ties are
broken by the ﬂip of a fair coin. The above is common knowledge among the bidders.
The sealed bid sequential auction works as follows. Two bidders are selected at random
from the population. In the ﬁrst stage, good 1,w h i c hm a yb eα or β, is brought up for sale.
Each participant submits a bid for good 1 that lies in [0,I(t)]. The bidder who submits the
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higher bid obtains good 1. The price paid for the good depends on the price formation rule
in eﬀect. After good 1 is sold, the winner’s budget is reduced by the price paid for good 1
and the winning bid is revealed. Bidders then bid on good 2 ({α,β} = {1,2}).
In the second stage of the game, the de facto valuation for good 2 o fab i d d e ro ft y p et is
the minimum of t’s initial valuation and t’s remaining income. I assume that once good 1 is
allocated, the price paid for good 1 along with the income of the winner of good 1 is public
knowledge. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that the equilibrium outcome in this
second stage is that in which the bidder with the higher de facto valuation obtains the good
at the lower de facto valuation, so that the price of good 2 is the lower de facto valuation.
Replacing the second stage of the game by the equilibrium payoﬀs in this standard equilib-
rium outcome we obtain a one-stage Bayesian16 game G that depends on the distribution of
valuations and resources for each population of bidders. This Bayesian game G is the game
that I study. The strategy set of a bidder of type t in G is [0,I(t)],t h es e to ff e a s i b l eb i d s
on good 1.T h er u l e so f G are the auction rules that allocate good 1 given bids; I restrict
attention to rules under which the individual who makes the higher bid obtains good 1 and
pays a price that is a non-decreasing function of the bids. (This includes but is not limited
to 1st and 2nd price formation rules.) I consider a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium of G;t h a t
is, I look for a function B :[ 0 ,1] → that assigns a bid to each type with the property that
(B,B) is a Nash equilibrium of G.
It is known that the price formation rule can aﬀect the revenue of an auction when
information is complete and so also when information is incomplete. I want to isolate the
eﬀect of the sequence of sale on the price of a good and therefore restrict to parameters
for which revenue is independent of the price formation rule. In order to avoid looking at
special cases, and in order to consider auctions in which the revenue is independent of the
price formation rule, I assume that, in equilibrium, a bidder’s income is large enough to
cover expenses and that no bidder is allocated both goods in equilibrium. Moreover, since
no individual is allocated both goods in equilibrium, the price of good 2 is the de facto
valuation for good 2 o ft h ew i n n e ro fg o o d1.
3 The Sequence of Sale Aﬀects Revenue and Prices
In a standard private value auction of only one good, the valuation of the good (which
coincides with a bidder’s de facto valuation) increases in a bidder’s type and the maximum
16See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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private valuation indicates the maximum revenue that an auction can generate. A bidding
function that increases in a bidder’s type maximizes the revenue generated and allocates the
good in an eﬃcient manner to the bidder who values the good more highly. The literature
typically restricts the search to symmetric equilibrium bidding functions that increase in a
bidder’s type. In budget-constrained sequential auctions, the willingness to pay for good 1
depends on the valuations for both goods and on income. In addition, a bidding function that
increases in this willingness to pay may not maximize revenue or allocate goods eﬃciently.
I ﬁrst discuss a bidder’s de facto valuation for good 1.
In a budget-constrained sequential auction, individual t’s de facto valuation of good 1
depends on the type of t’s opponent. As shown in the example computed in the introduction,
losing good 1 at a high price may enable a bidder to obtain good 2 at a low price. This may
be preferred to winning both goods at high prices. Let V (t,s) denote the de facto valuation
for good 1 of a bidder of type t who faces another bidder of type s. I fab i d d e ro ft y p et
faces a bidder of type s, then it must be the case that bidder t is willing to pay up to
v1(t) − v2(t)+I(s)
2








Deﬁne the critical value v(t)=V (t,t) to be the de facto valuation for good 1 of a bidder of
type t who faces another bidder of type t. In the auction literature for one good, the critical
value is synonymous with the bidder’s valuation for the good.
Suppose that f and g are real-valued functions on a domain S.Is a yt h a tf is ordinally
equivalent (denoted ORD-equivalent) to g on S whenever the set of indiﬀerence curves and
"better than" sets are common for f and g on S. In particular, any strictly monotonically
increasing function is ORD-equivalent to any other strictly monotonically increasing function.
Is a yt h a tf is ordinally reversed (denoted ORDR-equivalent) to g whenever there is one
common set of indiﬀerence curves but the "better than" set of one function is the "worse
than" set of the other function. In particular, any strictly monotonically increasing function
is ORDR-equivalent to any strictly monotonically decreasing function.
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In a standard auction, the literature restricts to a symmetric equilibrium bidding function
that is ORD-equivalent to the valuation function. I consider symmetric equilibrium bidding
functions that are ORD-equivalent to the critical value. However, unlike in the private
valuation auction literature for one good, a bidding function that is ORD-equivalent to
the critical value does not necessarily allocate the goods and income eﬃciently. It turns
out (Theorem 2) that a symmetric equilibrium bidding function that is ORD-equivalent to
v1−v2 allocates the goods and income eﬃciently. Thus, I also consider symmetric equilibrium
bidding functions that are ORD-equivalent to v1 − v2 so as to obtain an eﬃcient allocation
of the goods and income. There exist parameters for which there exists two non-equivalent
equilibrium bidding functions that diﬀer in their allocation of the goods.
In order to show that the set of parameters that satisfy the assumptions is not empty, I
oﬀer a condition that satisﬁes the assumptions. One condition that would allow one to avoid
looking at special cases, and to consider auctions in which the revenue is independent of the
price formation rule, is that, for all t ∈ [0,1]
max
s V (t,s) ≤ I(t) ≤ min
s V (t,s)+m i n
s v2(s) (2)
This condition satisﬁes the two assumptions since no bidder is willing to pay more than the
highest critical value and no equilibrium price of good 1 can be lower than the lowest critical
value. The second inequality of (2) says that, in equilibrium, any income remaining to the
w i n n e ro fg o o d1 must be less than or equal to the lowest valuation of good 2. But this
implies that the loser of good 1 must obtain good 2 in equilibrium. Moreover, the income of
t h ew i n n e ro fg o o d1 is depleted to below the winner’s valuation of good 2. It follows that
the price of good 2 is the depleted income of the winner of good 1. But then, in equilibrium
Revenue = income of the winner of good 1 (R)
It is immediate that a bidding function that is ORD-equivalent to the income function
maximizes auction revenue.
In the theorem below I consider budget-constrained sequential auctions in which income
and valuations satisfy all assumptions (this may happen for example if the parameters satisfy
(1) and (2)) and whose price formation rules satisfy the following conditions.
(S1) Bidders are treated anonymously (prices do not depend on the identity of bidders).
(S2) A good is sold to the higher bidder at a price that does not decrease in the bids.
(S3) Good 2 is sold to the bidder with the current higher de facto valuation at a price equal
to the current lower de facto valuation.
11Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information
(S4) There is a common symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy B for good 1.
Whether revenue is maximized or the allocation is eﬃcient depends on the equivalence
between the bidding function and the functions v1 − v2, I and v1 − v2 + I. In a standard
auction of one good, the eﬃcient allocation is that in which the good is allocated to the
bidder with the highest valuation. This is because, without budget constraints, a bidder
is always willing and able to bid up to the bidder’s valuation. An allocation in a budget-
constrained auction is eﬃcient if there are no Pareto improving trades but the willingness
and ability of an individual to pay for a good depends not only on the bidder’s valuation for
the good but also on the bidder’s remaining income. In any auction allocation of goods and
money let type tθ denote the type allocated good θ and income Rθ for θ ∈ (α,β).
Criterion 1 The allocation ((tα,R α),(tβ,R β)) is eﬃcient if and only if
vα(tβ) ≤ vα(tα) or Rβ ≤ vα(tα)
vβ(tα) ≤ vβ(tβ) or Rα ≤ vβ(tβ)
and
either vα(tα) − vβ(tα) ≥ vα(tβ) − vβ(tβ)
or
Rβ ≤ vα(tα) − vβ(tα)
Rα ≤ vβ(tβ) − vα(tβ)
We next explore when an allocation is eﬃcient and revenue is maximized. All proofs not
in the text are in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 In any budget-constrained sequential auction, the expected revenue is indepen-
dent of the price formation rules and depends only on the shape of the equilibrium bidding
function B. Whenever B(t) is ORD-equivalent to I(t), expected revenue is maximized. More-
over, such a revenue-maximizing sequential auction reaps more revenue than any auction in
which both goods are bundled and allocated simultaneously to one of the bidders. Whenever
B(t) is ORD-equivalent to v1(t) − v2(t), the allocation of goods and money is eﬃcient.
The Corollary follows immediately from Theorem 2.
Corollary 3 If B, vi(t) − vj(t) and I are ORD-equivalent, then revenue is maximized and
the goods are allocated eﬃciently when good i is sold ﬁrst.
Bernard and Scoones [1993] consider a 2nd price sequential auction of two stochastically
independently valued goods (denoted by A and B). Bidders are restricted to bidding on
one good only and do not know their own valuation of good 2 until after good 1 has been
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allocated. They ﬁnd that the seller’s revenues are greater when object A is auctioned ﬁrst
if the distribution of valuations for A has more dispersed order statistics than that of the
distribution of valuations for B. By contrast, the above theorem and corollary hold for any
auction form under consideration for which the income constraints are binding. In particular,
the proof here does not require the explicit calculation of equilibrium bidding functions, the
bidders know their valuations ex ante, and the bidders may bid on more than one good.
Thus, if there is a book value for one good that is highly valued but the value for the other
good is relatively low but highly variable then revenue is maximized when the good with the
book value is sold last. This predicts that, in estate auctions, heavy equipment (for example,
ride on lawn mowers) will be sold later than an item whose value may depend more heavily
on taste (for example, used bedspreads).
Note that I do not consider auctions in which all surplus is always extracted from the
w i n n e ro fg o o d2. One such case is that in which good 1 is allocated via an auction mechanism
and good 2 is awarded to the loser of good 1 at the loser’s valuation (which can be achieved
if the bidding function is monotonic and the auctioneer knows the bidding function and
therefore knows the valuations for good 2 once good 1 is allocated). In this case, it can
be shown that the expected revenue is independent of the auction mechanism under which
good 1 is awarded; the maximal expected revenue is the expected value of min{v1(t1)+
v2(t1),v 1(t2)+v2(t2)}. However, this method of allocation requires a lot of information on
the part of the auctioneer. Competition among auctioneers mitigates against its use and
increases the surplus available to bidders.
The next result shows that the law of one price need not hold for identical goods. We
see that, in any auction under consideration, the expected prices of identical goods depend
on the sequence of sale. Income constraints are enough to imply that the expected price
of identical units of a good increases the later it is sold. By contrast, Black and De Meza
[1993] analyze a model in which two units of a good are sold sequentially in a 2nd price sealed
bid auction to n bidders whose incomes are not constrained. In their model, a consumer’s
valuation of a unit depends on how many units the consumer has already bought. Under
some assumptions on valuations17, the expected price of the second unit sold is higher than
that of the ﬁrst. The result below is not restricted to 2nd price rules.
Theorem 4 If the equilibrium bidding function B(t) is ORD-equivalent to v1(t)−v2(t)+I(t)
and I(t), then the expected price of good 1 is less than that of good 2 whenever v2(w1) −
17The valuation b of the ﬁrst unit bought by a consumer is drawn independently from a common distribution.
The valuation of the second unit bought is kb where k i sﬁ x e da n dc o m m o nt oe a c hb i d d e r .
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v1(w1) ≥ 0 where w1 denotes the expected type for which
v1(w1) − v2(w1)+I(w1)=e x pm a x ( v1(t1) − v2(t1)+I(t1),v 1(t2) − v2(t2)+I(t2))
It follows immediately that whenever each bidder considers the two goods to be identical,
the expected price of the good 1 sold is higher than that of good 1.
Corollary 5 If vα(t)=vβ(t) for all t and the equilibrium bidding function is ORD-equivalent
to I, then the expected price of good 2 sold is higher than that of good 1.
In particular, the expected prices diﬀer if the goods are identical across bidder types. I
now explore opportunities for arbitrage in this case.
Theorem 6 If vα(t)=vβ(t)=v(t) for all t and the equilibrium bidding function is ORD-
equivalent to I, then the expected price that any one bidder expects to pay in the auction is
constant across bidders.
Theorems 4 and 6 state that when vα(t)=vβ(t) for all t and the bidding function is ORD-
equivalent to I, the expected price of good 1 is less than that of good 2 even though the
expected price that any one bidder expects to pay in the auction is constant across bidders.
To see how this result is possible, let p∗ be the common expected price that a bidder expects
to pay in the auction. Since good 1 is allocated to the bidder with the higher bid and good
2 is allocated to the bidder with the lower bid, the bidder whose type is associated with the
highest bid obtains good 1 for sure at a price of p∗, while the bidder whose type is associated
with the lowest bid obtains good 2 for sure at a price of p∗. Since the price paid for a good
is increasing in the bids, p∗ is the highest price paid for good 1 and the lowest price paid
for good 2. A bidder whose type is associated with a bid between the highest and lowest
bids sometimes obtains good 1 for a price lower than p∗ and sometimes obtains good 2 for
a price higher than p∗ but on average obtains a good for a price of p∗.Thus, the price that
any single bidder expects to pay in the auction is constant across bidders even though the
expected price of good 1 i sl o w e rt h a nt h a to fg o o d2. A violation of the law of one price
does not imply opportunities for arbitrage.
4 The Expected Price of a Good Depends on the Price
Formation Rule
Theorem 2 shows that the revenue can be aﬀected by the sequence of sale when income
varies with type. It follows that, if income varies, then the sequence of sale can also aﬀect
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the prices of the goods. However, as shown below, the price formation rule may aﬀects the
prices even in the case that income is constant across types. In addition, the price formation
rule may aﬀect the way in which the price of a good depends on the sequence of sale.
Let B be an equilibrium bidding function. Since (B,B) is an equilibrium of G,t h e
“truthful” strategy proﬁle in which each type t chooses t is an equilibrium of the associated
game G(B) in which each bidder’s strategy set is the set [0,1] of types and the payoﬀ of
type t when s is announced is that which type t obtains in G when type t bids B(s).I
study equilibria of G(B) for any continuous bidding function B that is not constant over any
interval. Riley and Samuelson (1981) study only continuous bidding functions that increase
in t since the valuation of the single good is continuous and increases in t. They ﬁnd that
the equilibrium price (and therefore revenue) is independent of the price formation rule. By
contrast, even though the expected revenue is independent of the price formation rule, the
equilibrium price of good 1 varies with the rule.
Theorem 7 The equilibrium price of good 1 depends on the price formation rules.
Thus, even though the world is restricted to be one in which the expected revenue is
independent of the price formation rule, the expected prices do vary with the rules. Che and
Gale [1993] show that in a budget-constrained auction of one good, the expected price of the
single good (which is equivalent to revenue in this case) is higher under 1st price rules than
under 2nd price rules. In the auctions that we consider, revenue is constant across price rules
but the price of each good varies across rules.
5 Relationship between Bidding Function and Exoge-
nous Functions
In this section, we analyze the relationship between the shape of the equilibrium bidding
function and either v1−v2+I or v1−v2. We ﬁrst show that the existence of a non-monotonic
equilibrium bidding function is tied to the existence of a non-monotonic v1 − v2.
Theorem 8 If there exists S1 ⊂ [0,1] and S2 ⊂ [0,1]\S1 and a function  x : S1 −→ S2
for which the equilibrium bidding function B satisﬁes B(t)=B( x(t)) for t ∈ S1, then the
diﬀerence in the value functions satisﬁes v1(t) − v2(t)=v1( x(t)) − v2( x(t)) for t ∈ S1.
We say that a function is S-monotonic on an interval T if, for t ∈ T, the indiﬀerence curve
through t is the singleton {t}. We now show that the existence of an S-monotonic equilibrium
bidding function on an interval T is tied to the existence of a monotonic v1 − v2 + I.
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Theorem 9 Suppose that D12P(t,s)=D21P(s,t)=0for all s,t and either one of D1P(t,s)
and D2P(s,t) equals zero or D2P(t,s)=γD1P(s,t) for γ>0. If an equilibrium bidding
function B is S-monotonic on an interval T,t h e nsign(B￿)=sign(v1 − v2 + I) on T.
We note that when P is not a member of the class of price rules assumed by Theorem 9,
then B may or may not be ORD-equivalent to v1−v2+I when B is monotonic18.T h e o r e m s
8 and 9 indicate the possible existence of multiple bidding functions that diﬀer with respect
to allocation, revenue and eﬃciency19.
6 1st and 2nd Price Rules
I now restrict attention to 1st and 2nd price formation rules. Theorem 10) generalizes a
theoretical and experimental complete information result in Pitchik and Schotter (1988).
Theorem 10 If the equilibrium bidding function under 1st price rules is ORD-equivalent to
the equilibrium bidding function under 2nd price rules, then the expected price of good 1 is
higher under 2nd price rules than under 1st price rules.
Intuitively, under 1st price rules, a bidder is worried about being allocated good 1 at a
relatively high price and so makes a relatively conservative bid. Under 2nd price rules, a
bidder is worried about not winning the good at a relatively low price.
Theorem 4 implies that when the goods are identical, the expected price of a good is
higher the later it is sold under general price rules. Theorems 11 and 12 below compare the
price of a good when it is sold ﬁrst to the price of the good when it is sold second under 1st
and 2nd price rules. There are two cases to consider.
When income is an index of an individual’s ability to use the good proﬁtably, then we
expect that v1 − v2 + I to be ORD-equivalent to I independent of the order of sale since,
then, the value of a good changes less rapidly than the value of income. Denote by Bθγ the
equilibrium bidding function when the order of sale is (θ,γ) for {θ,γ} = {α,β}.
Theorem 11 If vα − vβ + I, vβ − vα + I, I, are ORD-equivalent to the equilibrium bidding
functions Bα,β and Bβ,α then the expected revenue is independent of the sequence of sale and
the expected price of a good is higher, the later it is sold.
18If P(s,t)=P(t,s)=
￿
B(s)B(t), then the assumptions of Theorem 9 are violated. Equation (4) is solved
by the increasing B(t)=( t +1 )
2 if either v1(t) − v2(t)+I(t)=3 t2 +6 t + 1
2 (is increasing) and H(t)=t or
if v1(t) − v2(t)+I(t)=10
3 t2 +8 t − 8
3t1/2 +2(is non-monotonic) and H(t)=t1/2.
19Two bidding functions B and ￿ B exist if v1 − v2 + I and I increase on [0,1] but v1 − v2 increases on [0,a],
is concave on [a,1] such that v1(a) − v2(a)=v1(1) − v2(1). B,t h a ti sS - i n c r e a s i n go n[0,1], allocates good
one to the bidder with the higher income and maximizes revenue. ￿ B, that is S-increasing on [0,a] and is
ORD-equivalent to v1 − v2 on [a,1], allocates the goods eﬃciently but does not maximize revenue.
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T h u s ,i fi n c o m ev a r i e sw i d e l yr e l a t i v et ot h ev a l u eo fe i t h e rg o o d( a sm i g h th a p p e nw h e n
the goods are economy cars) then the expected price of the good is higher the later it is sold.
When the valuation for one good is highly variable because of vagaries of taste or because
of the existence of imperfect markets and the random nature of private information, then we
expect vα − vβ to be ORDR-equivalent to vβ − vα.W ew o u l dl i k et oc o m p a r et h ep r i c eo f
goods as a function of the sequence but in order to do so we need to keep revenue constant.
In the case that the shape of the critical value function depends on the sequence in which
the goods are sold, the expected revenue is independent of the sequence only if the income is
independent of type. In this case, either sequence maximizes revenue. If income is constant
across types and vα −vβ +I is ORDR-equivalent to vβ −vα +I, then the expected prices of
the goods depend on the sequence and on the price formation rules as stated next.
Theorem 12 Suppose that v1−v2+I is ORD-equivalent to the bidding function under either
order but that vα − vβ + I is ORDR-equivalent to vβ − vα + I and I(t)=I is constant. (1)
Under 1st price rules the expected price of a good is higher the later it is sold. (2) Under 2nd
price rules the expected price of a good is higher the earlier it is sold.
Clearly whether the price of a good increases or decreases with its order in the sequence
of sale depends on the price formation rules in this case20. The reason the results in Theorem
12 are so diﬀerent from those of Theorems 4 and 11 is as follows. As the variation in the
diﬀerences in valuation for each good are essentially dwarfed by that of income in Theorems
4 and 11, income plays the following role in determining the allocation of each good. The
individual with the higher income obtains good 1 under either sequence and under any price
formation rule. Thus, the results do not depend on the price formation rule and the allocation
varies with the sequence. However, in Theorem 12, the variation in the valuation of good
α say dwarfs that of good β and income combined so that both the valuation and position
(whether ﬁrst or second) of good α play a role in determining the price of each good. In
this case, under any price formation rule and under any sequence, the individual who values
good α more highly obtains good α.
Now suppose that the value of one good, α say, varies with a bidder’s type while the
income and the value of the other good, say β, is independent of the bidder’s type. Further
suppose that the values share a common mean. In this case, Theorem 12 implies that the
price of similar goods decreases with its position in the order of sale as the auction proceeds
under 2nd price rules. Under 2nd price rules, a bidder is able to bid up the price of good 1 in
order to obtain good 2 at a lower price than otherwise.
20generalizing theoretical and experimental complete information results in Pitchik and Schotter (1988).
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7 Robustness
I consider the robustness of the results with respect to 2nd price rules in this section. Pre-
viously, I have assumed that bidders draw their types from a common pool and that the
number of bidders and goods equal two. I have also assumed that each valuation is less than
income and that no individual obtains both goods in equilibrium. My aim in this section is
to show that revenue and prices can be aﬀected by the sequence in which the goods are sold
even when these assumptions are relaxed. In particular, I consider two possibilities below.
In the ﬁrst, the number of bidders is larger than the number of goods and the income is less
than the valuations. In the second, one bidder may obtain both goods in equilibrium.
I ﬁrst provide an example in which the order of sale in a sequential auction of two goods
can aﬀect the revenue of an auction and the price of a good even in the presence of many
bidders who each have a common income. Consider an auction of two goods α and β to n>2
bidders. Suppose that I(t)=I and vα(t) > (n − 1)(vβ(t) − I)+I>v β(t) − I>I>0 for
t ∈ [0,1] so that each individual has constant income that is less than the valuation of either
good and each individual highly values good α relative to good β and income. Note that,
since each bidder is endowed with a common ﬁxed income that is less than the valuation of
either good, no bidder obtains more than one good in equilibrium. I want to compare the
p r i c eo fe a c hg o o di ft h eo r d e ro fs a l ei sαβ to that when the order of sale is βα. If the order
of sale is αβ then each individual’s equilibrium bidding function for good α is21 B(t)=I.
Thus, the expected equilibrium price of good α is I.S i n c en>2 there are still at least two
individuals with an income of I who compete for good β.S o ,w h e nt h eg o o d sa r es o l di nt h e
order αβ, the price of good α is I;t h a to fg o o dβ is I since n>2. If instead, the goods are
sold in the order βα then I claim that the expected price of β is less than I. The reason is
as follows. Suppose that the expected price of β is I. In this case, at least two individuals
bid I.L e tm ≥ 2 be the number of individuals who bid I. The payoﬀ to each who bids I is
(vβ(t)−I)/m+[(m−1)/m](vα(t)−I)/(n−1) while the payoﬀ to anyone who bids just less
than I is (vα(t)−I)/(n−1). By assumption vα(t)−I>(n−1)(vβ(t)−I), so that it cannot
be that m ≥ 2 bidders bid I in equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium price of β must be less
than I. It follows that when the goods are sold in the order βα the expected equilibrium
price of β is less than I as claimed. Thus, revenue is highest when α is sold ﬁrst and the
price of β increases with its position in the order of sale. The reason is that when β is sold
second, there are always at least two individuals who are willing and able to pay I for β so
21Ab i do fI results in the payoﬀ vα(t)/n+vβ(t)(n−1)/n(n−1)−I. A bid less than I results in vβ(t)/(n−1)−I.
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that competition is intense when β is sold second; when β is sold ﬁrst, competition is not as
intense since each bidder wants to have income to bid on good α.
The above illustrates that the revenue and prices of goods may depend on the sequence
in which the goods are sold even when there are many bidders and only two goods. Under
the above assumptions, revenue is maximized when the more valuable good is sold ﬁrst.
I now analyse the model when there are asymmetries among the bidders as well as
changes to the assumptions on income relative to valuations so that a bidder may obtain
both goods in equilibrium. Let’s assume that the valuations of the two goods are ﬁxed such
that vα(t)=A, vβ(t)=B<A . Suppose that there are two pools of bidders. Bidder one is
richer than bidder two, although neither is rich relative to the value of good α.S p e c i ﬁ c a l l y ,
let’s assume that I1(t) ∈ [c1,d 1] and that I2(t)=I where A>d 1 >c 1 > 2I>B>Iso that
bidder 1 has enough income to buy both goods since bidder 2 is relatively and absolutely
p o o r .I ft h eg o o d sa r ea u c t i o n e di nt h eo r d e rα,β then each bidder is willing to pay at least
I for α so that bidder one obtains good α at a price of I in equilibrium. Once good α is
allocated, each bidder is willing to pay at least I for good β. Since bidder one has more
than double the income of bidder two and since good α is relatively highly valued, bidder
one obtains both goods in equilibrium when the order of sale is αβ. The equilibrium price of
each good equals I and the equilibrium revenue is 2I. However, now suppose that the goods
are sold in the order β,α. In this case, bidder one is not willing to pay I for good β.T h e
payoﬀ to bidder one is A −(I −p) if bidder one gives up good β to bidder two at a price of
p. If instead, bidder one wins good β at a price of p then bidder one receives B −p+A−I.
It follows that the most that bidder one is willing to pay for good β is B/2 <I .B i d d e r
t w oi sw i l l i n gt op a yu pt oI for good β since otherwise, bidder two receives nothing. In the
equilibrium allocation when the goods are sold in the order βα, bidder two obtains good β
and bidder one obtains good α. The equilibrium price of β is B/2 and that of α is I −B/2.
The equilibrium revenue is I. In summary, the revenue is higher when α (the more highly
valued good) is sold ﬁrst; the price of good α (the good that is allocated to the rich bidder
independent of its order of sale) is higher when α is sold ﬁrst; the price of good β (the good
that is allocated to the rich bidder only when it is sold second) is higher when β is sold
second. That revenue is higher when α is sold ﬁrst is consistent with the implications of
Theorem 2 in which the revenue is higher when good 1 is sold to the rich bidder. Under the
assumptions of Theorem 12, α is allocated to the rich bidder, independent of the order of
sale and the price of α is higher the earlier it is sold under 2nd price rules. In our example,
α is allocated to the rich bidder independent of the order of sale and the price of α is higher
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the earlier it is sold. That the price of good α is higher when sold ﬁrst in our example is
therefore consistent with Theorem 12. Under the assumptions of Theorem 11 the price of a
good is higher the later it is sold when the competition for the good is higher the later it is
sold. In our example, β is allocated to the rich bidder only when it is sold second so that
competition for β is higher when it is sold second. That the price of good β is higher when
sold second is consistent with Theorem 11.
Thus, even when one bidder is relatively rich, revenue and price may depend on the order
of sale. If there is one good that is highly valued by all and there is a clearly strong bidder
then revenue is higher when the more valuable good is sold ﬁrst; the more valuable good
is allocated to the stronger bidder independent of its position of sale and its price is higher
when it is sold ﬁrst; the less valuable good is allocated to the stronger bidder only if it sold
second and its price is higher when it is sold second. Whether the price of a good increases
or decreases with its position in the order of sale depends on how the order of sale aﬀects
the competition for the good.
T h ep r i c eo fag o o di sa ﬀ e c t e db yt h eo r d e ro fs a l e . H o wi ti sa ﬀ e c t e dd e p e n d so nt h e
valuations. In one case, the price is higher when a good is sold earlier. In another case, the
price is higher when a good is sold later. It depends on whether, in equilibrium, good 1 goes
to the stronger bidder independent of which good is sold ﬁrst or whether a designated good
goes to the stronger bidder. When good 1 goes to the stronger bidder independent of the
order of sale, then there is no disadvantage in obtaining good 1 because, if there were, the
stronger bidder would just mimic the weaker bidder. In this case, the price of a good must
increase with its position in the order of sale. When a designated good goes to the higher
bidder, then the competition for the good is higher when it is sold ﬁrst and so price decreases
w i t hi t sp o s i t i o ni nt h eo r d e ro fs a l e .
8C o n c l u s i o n
In the presence of budget constraints there may exist two symmetric equilibrium bidding
functions that diﬀer with respect to allocation, prices and revenue. Prices depend on the
price formation rules. In addition, even in the absence of arbitrage possibilities, identical
goods may fetch diﬀerent prices. The sequence of sale aﬀects the expected revenue through
the allocation of the goods. Whenever the winner of good 1 is the bidder with the higher
income, expected revenue is maximized. Under 1st and 2nd price rules, whenever, independent
of the sequence, the winner of good 1 is the bidder with the higher income, the expected
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price of a good is no lower the later it is sold. Intuitively, if good 1 is always sold to the
stronger bidder, then there can be no disadvantage in winning good 1. This happens when
the goods are similar enough and income is relatively variable. By contrast, if, independent
of the sequence, the stronger bidder is allocated a designated good (that may be good 1 or
good 2), the expected price of a good decreases under 2nd price rules and increases under 1st
price rules. Intuitively, under 2nd price rules, there is an incentive for the loser of good 1 to
bid up its price, depleting the winner’s income, in order to obtain good 2 at a lower price.
Thus, when the allocation of the goods is independent of the sequence and 2nd price rules
prevail, the expected price of a good declines with its position in the order of sale. Under 1st
price rules, a higher bid of the loser does not aﬀect the price of good 1 and may adversely
aﬀect the payoﬀ of the loser so that bids are more conservative.
Basically, the price of a good is higher whenever competition for the good is higher. If
bidders are drawn from populations that diﬀer according to income, then goods that are
always allocated to the richer bidder fetch a higher price when sold ﬁrst. Goods that are
sold to the richer bidder only when sold second fetch a higher price when sold second.
Other links between the goods can have the same eﬀect as do budget-constraints. For
example, if ﬁrms with limited plant capacities bid on projects let by the government, the
results of letting any given contract will depend on the available capacity of ﬁrms in the
industry. The results should not be qualitatively diﬀerent in this case.
9 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: By (R), expected revenue equals the expected income of the winner
of good 1.I fB(t) is ORD-equivalent to I(t) under any price formation rule then good 1 is
allocated to the bidder with the higher income so that, by (R), the expected revenue is the
expected value of the higher income. Thus, the expected revenue is independent of the price
formation rules and depends only on the shape of the equilibrium bidding function.
We now compare revenue in the revenue-maximizing sequential auction to that in an
auction in which both goods are sold simultaneously. When both goods are sold simulta-
neously to one of the bidders, rather than sequentially, an individual t’s de facto valuation
of holding both goods is I(t) by assumption (1). Thus, the auction in which both goods
are sold simultaneously is equivalent to an auction in which one good is sold whose value to
individual t is I(t). The result follows since no auction of a single good can yield an expected
revenue equal to the expected value of the highest valuation (Riley and Samuelson [1981]).
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In the case that the bidding function is ORD-equivalent to v1 − v2, the individual who
obtains good 1 (say type t1)h a st h eh i g h e rv1 −v2 while the individual who obtains good 2
(say type t2)h a st h el o w e rv1−v2. By assumption, in equilibrium, the remaining income R1
of the individual t1 is less than v2(t2), the valuation for good 2 of individual t2.T h u s ,i ft h e
bidding function B is ORD-equivalent to v1 − v2, then the allocation is eﬃcient.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 : The de facto valuation of good 1 for a bidder of type t who faces a
bidder of type s is V (t,s)=( v1(t)−v2(t)+I(s))/2.S i n c eB is ORD-equivalent to v1−v2+I
and I, the average price that a bidder of type t expects to pay for good 1 is strictly less than
bidder t’s critical value v(t)=( v1(t)−v2(t)+I(t))/2. In this case the expected price of good
1 must be strictly less than the critical value of the expected winner. Thus, the expected
price of good 1 must be strictly less than
v1(w1) − v2(w1)+I(w1)
2
However, by (R), the expected revenue is I(w1). Thus, the expected price of good 2 must
be strictly greater than
v2(w1) − v1(w1)+I(w1)
2
and therefore the diﬀerence between the expected price of good 2 a n dt h a to fg o o d1 is
strictly greater than v2(w1) − v1(w1) as required.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6 : If the other bidder uses the equilibrium strategy B(t),l e t∆(x) be
the probability that a bidder of type t who pretends to be type x wins good 2 and let  P(x)
be the expected payment made by such a bidder. The expected payoﬀ Π(t,x) of such a bidder
equals the expected beneﬁt minus the expected payment
Π(t,x)=v1(t)(1 − ∆(x)) + v2(t)(∆(x)) −  P(x)
Let D￿
i denote the partial derivative operator with respect to the ith variable. In equilibrium,
D￿




Since v1(t)=v2(t), (3) implies  P￿(t)=0for all t as required.
In order to prove the next Theorem, we need to develop further the expected payment
made by an individual of type t who pretends to be of type x.L e tP∗(x) denote the expected
price that an individual (who claims to be of type x)p a y sf o rg o o d1 and P∗(x) denote
the expected price that an individual (who claims to be of type x)p a y sf o rg o o d2.T h u s ,
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 P(t,x)=P∗(x)+P∗(x).L e tP(x,z) denote the price that an individual who claims to be
of type x pays for good 1 if the other individual claims to be of type z. It is also necessary
to deﬁne the circumstances under which an individual might win good 2. Recall that the de
facto valuation of good 2 o fab i d d e ro ft y p et is the minimum of t’s valuation for good 2 and
any income remaining to t from the auction of good 1. The individual with the higher de
facto valuation obtains good 2 at the lower de facto valuation. There are two ways in which
individual t may obtain good 2. Either individual t wins good 1 and has enough income
remaining to win good 2 as well; or, individual t loses good 1 and t’s valuation of good 2 is
higher than the remaining income of t’s opponent.
Let σ1(t,x) be the set of opponents who lose good 1. Of these, some may also lose good
2. Denote this latter set by σ12(t,x).L e tσ2(t,x) denote the set of opponents who lose only
good 2.T h u s , i f s ∈ σ12(t,x) then individual t obtains good 1 at the price P(x,s) and
obtains good 2 at the price v2(s);i fs ∈ σ1(t,x), then individual t obtains good 1 at the
price P(x,s) and may or may not obtain good 2;i fi n s t e a ds ∈ σ2(t,x) then individual t
loses good 1 and obtains good 2 at the price min{v2(s),I(s) − P(s,x)}. In equilibrium, the
expected payoﬀ must be maximized when x = t. By assumption, no bidder wins both goods
in equilibrium so that, in equilibrium, σ12(t,t)=∅ (which implies that σ1(t,t)+σ2(t,t)=1 )
and v2(s) >I (s) − P(s,t) for s ∈ σ2(t,t).I f s(x) is an upper end point of an interval in
σ1(t,x) that varies with x then s(x) is a lower end point of an interval in σ2(t,x) so that the
derivative (evaluated at x = t)o f

σ1(t,x) H￿(s)ds with respect to x equals the the negative of
t h ed e r i v a t i v e( e v a l u a t e da tx = t)o f












P r o o fo fT h e o r e m7 : In equilibrium, P(s,t)=P(t,t) for all endpoints s of intervals in
















































 (s)ds − P(t,t)∆
 (t)
23Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information
we can substitute for P(t,t)∆ (t) from (4) to obtain
P
∗ (x)=
−(v1(t) − v2(t))∆ (t) − δ
 (t)+






The left-hand side of (5) is the expected price of good one and the right-hand side of (5)
depends on the price formation rule22. The result follows.
























































If instead of t varying in S2,w eh a v et varying in S1 and  x(t) varying in S2,w ec a n































































22The analog of equation (5) in the standard one good auction is P∗ (t)=v(t)H (t) which is independent of
the price formation rules.
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However, by deﬁnition of  x(t), σ2(t,t)=σ2( x(t), x(t)), σ1(t,t)=σ1( x(t), x(t)), P(s,t)=
P(s, x(t)), D2P(s,t)=D2P(s, x(t)) x (t), P(t,s)=P( x(t),s), D1P(t,s)=D2P( x(t),s) x (t),























































Thus, (6) and (11) must hold for t ∈ S1 which implies the result.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m9 :I fB is S-increasing on T then σ2(t,t)=( t,1) and σ1(t,t)=( 0 ,t)
so that, since D12P(t1,t 2)=D21P(t1,t 2)=0 , (4) implies that
D2P(t,t)(1 − H(t)) − D1P(t,t)H(t) − 2P(t,t)H
 (t) (12)
= −(v1(t) − v2(t)+I(t))H
 (t) for t ∈ T
I nt h ec a s et h a to n eo fD1P(t,s) or D2P(s,t) equals zero, then, since D1P(t,t)+ D2P(t,t)=
DP(t,t),( 1 2 )i m p l i e st h a teither
DP(t,t)(1 − H(t)) − 2P(t,t)H

































1(s) − v 
2(s)+I (s))ds
(1 − H(t))3




























1(s) − v 
2(s)+I (s))ds
(H(t))3
Thus, when one of D1P(t,s) or D2P(s,t) equals zero, the sign of DP equals that of v 
1−v 
2+I .
However, since P(t,t) is ORD-equivalent to B(t), and since B is S-increasing on T,t h i s
implies that v1 − v2 + I is increasing on T.


























































so that again to v1 − v2 + I is increasing on T. Analogous arguments show that the results
remain when B is S-decreasing on T.
The following lemmas are used to prove Theorems 10, 11, and 12.
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Lemma 13 Let W :[ 0 ,1] −→ [0,1] be onto and continuous. Let J be the union of intervals
over which the cover of W is strictly monotonic on J.L e tW −1(0) = c, W−1(1) = d where




G(t)=2 ( 1 − W(t))










































Proof. We ﬁrst note that F(c)=−1/4=F(d), G(c)=−1/2=G(d).
F  (t)=W (t)(lnW(t)+2− 2W(t)) = W  (t)J(t)












 (t)(2ln(1 − W(t)) + 1)
Since W   > 0 if and only if c<d ,a st increases along (c,d)∩J, F(t) decreases then increases
while G(t) increases then decreases which proves the ﬁrst pair of results.
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Let L be ORDR-equivalent to W and W   > 0. c<dand L  < 0 implies the last result.
Given any bidding function B and its associated probability ∇(t)=1− ∆(t),t h e r ei sa
monotonic cover of B.D e n o t e b y J the union of intervals over which the cover is strictly
monotonic and let c = ∇
−1(0), d = ∇
−1(1) denote the end-points of J. Either the cover
is strictly increasing over J and c<dor the cover is strictly decreasing over J and d<c .
Even though there may be gaps in J, by nature of a cover, the values of the bidding function
form a continuous range as t ranges over J. Below, the subscripts indicate the price rule.
Lemma 14 If the equilibrium bidding function under 1st price rules is ORD-equivalent to







Proof.S i n c eB1 and B2 are ORD-equivalent there are ORD-equivalent monotonic covers
of B1 and B2 with a common associated J and ∇.S i n c e∇(t)=1− ∆(t), (4) implies
B
 
2(t)(1 −∇ (t)) − 2B2(t)∇






 (t)=( v1(t) − v2(t))∇


















The next two Lemmas restrict to 1st (denoted by a =0 )a n d2nd price rules (denoted by
a =1 ). Let the subscripts on B denote the order of sale.
Lemma 15 If va − vβ + I, vβ − vα + I and I are each ORD-equivalent to the equilibrium
bidding function under order α,β and under order β,α then, for t ∈ J
Bα,β(t)+Bβ,α(t)=I(t) − a

(d,t)∩J(1 −∇ (s))2I (s)ds
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Proof.S i n c e Bα,β and Bβ.α are ORD-equivalent, the associated J and ∆ are common.
Since ∇(t)=1−∆(t), (4) and the fact that I is ORD-equivalent to both bidding functions
imply the next three equations
B
 
α,β(t)(a(1 −∇ (t)) − (1 − a)∇(t)) − 2Bα,β(t)∇




β,α(t)(a(1 −∇ (t)) − (1 − a)∇(t)) − 2Bβ,α(t)∇










(a(1 −∇ (t)) − (1 − a)∇(t))−2(Bα,β(t)+Bβ,α(t))∇
 (t)=−2I(t)∇
 (t)
Lemma 16 If va − vβ + I is ORDR-equivalent to vβ − vα + I and each bidding function is














for t ∈ J
Proof.S i n c e∇(t)=1− ∆(t), (4) implies that
B
 



































which implies the result where ∇α,β(c)=0 , ∇α,β(d)=1 , c,d ∈ J where ∇α,β is ORD-
equivalent to Bα,β on J which is ORDR-equivalent to Bβ,α on J.
Proof of Theorem 10: By assumption, there is a common ∇ and J. Since the expected
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P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 1 :I fvα−vβ+I, vβ−vα+I, I, are ORD-equivalent to the equilibrium
bidding functions Bα,β and Bβ,α then the expected income of the bidder with the higher bid
is independent of the sequence of sale so that the expected revenue is independent of the se-
quence of sale. Since the sum of the expected prices of the goods equals expmax{I(t1),I(t2)},
the diﬀerence expβ,α
α −exppα,β
α in the expected price of good α under sequence β,α and the
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 (t)dt ≥ 0
Proof of Theorem 12: WLOG, I focus on α and assume Ba,β strictly increases on J.























































































































































under 1st price rules (a =0 ) which proves the result.
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